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WHITE-COLLAR CRIME IN BRAZIL: LEGISLATION, COURT
DECISIONS, AND THE OPINION OF LEGAL WRITERS
Peter Walter Ashton'
One of the first Brazilian laws issued with the intent to protect the public from
unscrupulous administrators of public savings (economia popular) was Law No.
1.521 of December 1951. This law remains in effect, and articles 2, 3, and 4
enumerate in great detail an extensive number of crimes that may be perpetrated
against the public and its savings. The list of hypothetical criminal acts included
in the statute is rather extensive.'
While it would be tedious to enumerate all the cases and crimes contained in
Law No. 1.521, it is interesting to note that many of the included crimes are not
specifically white-collar crimes, but crimes against free enterprise and crimes
employing economic power and market domination.' More modem and specific
* Professor of Law, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil.
The list of hypothetical criminal acts includes hiding merchandise or refusing to sell
merchandise to a buyer who is able to pay for it. These types of acts result in the favoring of
one buyer or client over another, causing financial loss to the latter. Other examples ofcrimes
addressed by Law No. 1.521 include: (1) refusing to perform services, when working in a
sales establishment of a commercial nature, that are essential to one's subsistence; (2) signing
and participating in contracts that impose fixed resale prices; (3) demanding that a buyer not
purchase goods from another producer; (4) obtaining or trying to obtain illegal profits by
means of illegal speculation or fraudulent proceedings, causing harm to a specific group of
people or to an indeterminate number of persons; (5) promoting or participating in
agreements, consortiums, alliances, adjustments or mergers of capitals, with the intent to
oppose or diminish free trade and bidding in the areas of production, transportation, and
general trade in order to obtain an arbitrary increase in profits; (6) selling merchandise below
cost to oppose free trade and other offers; (7) surreptitiously retaining or collecting raw
materials, means of production, or basic products necessary to the sustenance of the people,
with the intent to dominate the market anywhere in the country in order to force a price
increase; (8) causing, by means of false information, fictitious operations, or any other
artifices, the increase or decrease of prices of merchandise, public securities, or salaries; (9)
passing false information or statements in prospectuses and announcements in order to sell,
buy, or substitute negotiable instruments, securities, stock, or interest in shares of
partnerships; (10) managing, directing, or exercising functions in more than one corporation
or partnership of the same type of industry or trade with the intent to oppose free trade or to
make free bidding more difficult; (11) administering, in a fraudulent or reckless manner,
financial institutions such as banks, insurance companies, pension funds, loan companies,
construction finance companies, and savings and loan associations, causing their insolvency,
bankruptcy, or non-performance of contractual clauses causing loss to interested parties; and
(12) defrauding shareholders and partners by illegal or fraudulent accounting procedures, and
making false statements or representations. Lei No. 1.521, de 26 de dezembro de 1951, D.O.
de 26.12.1951.
2 Id.
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legislation has been issued over the past fifty years to complement Law No. 1.521.
For example, Law No. 8.884, of June 11, 1994, deals specifically with crimes
against the economic order through market domination.3
Punishment of crimes committed under the regency of Law No. 1.521 includes
fines and prison terms from two to ten years under the detention system, which is
more lenient than the reclusion system (solitary confinement).4
For approximately fifteen years, no important legislation was issued to fight
white-collar crimes and financial shenanigans. Finally, in 1964, the Revolutionary
Government, headed by the military and President General Humberto Castello
Branco, issued Law No. 4.595, of December 1964, through Congress.' The law
reorganized the banking system, created the legal concept of the National Financial
System, created the Central Bank of Brazil, regulated all public federal financial
institutions, recognized both public state institutions and all private financial
institutions, and instituted the National Monetary Council to organize, supervise ad
regulate the whole system.6 Law No. 4.5 95 is of paramount importance and remains
in force, though partially updated in some aspects, such as with respect to banking
secrecy.'
Article 34 enumerates forbidden transactions and deals performed by financial
institutions.8 These transactions and deals include making loans and pre-payments
to any administrators, members of consulting or management councils, anyone on
the board of supervisors or any similar board, spouses, in-laws, or next of kin up to
the second grade. Additionally, loans may not be made to natural persons or legal
entities that hold more than ten percent of the capital of the financial institution
extending the loan, except when the Central Bank of Brazil gives specific
authorization for the loan.9 Loans and money advancements to businesses of which
the financial institution controls more than ten percent of the capital also are
forbidden. " The same rule applies to legal entities, partnerships, corporations, and
associations if more than ten percent of the capital is controlled or held by any
director or administrator, or their spouses or relatives, of the loan-giving
institution."' The statute imposes further restrictions on the issuance by financial
institutions of bonds and beneficiary shares (participation in net profits up to ten
percent). ' However, loans made by public financial institutions to legal entities,
3 Lei No. 8.884, de 11 de junho de 1994, D.O.U. de 13.6.1994.
' Lei No. 1.521, de 26 de dezembro de 1951, D.O. de 26.12.1951.
5 Lei No. 4.595, de 31 de dezembro de 1964, D.O.U. de 31.1.1965.
6 Id.
Lei Complementar No. 105, de 10 de janeiro de 2001, D.O.U. de 11.1.2001.
Lei No. 4.595, art. 34, de 31 de dezembro de 1964, D.O.U. de 31.1.1965.
9Id.
10 Id.
I Id.
12 Id.
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the capital of which the loan giving institution controls, are exempted. 3
Punishment is specified in paragraph I of article 34: All such deals and operations
are crimes punishable by one to four years of prison in solitary confinement
(reclus~o).' 4
According to Law No. 4.595, another type of white-collar crime is the breaking
of secrecy (sigilo), even in situations where the financial information was given to
the agents or officers of the Internal Revenue Service, Central Bank, National
Monetary Council, or other governmental agencies. Failure to observe the secrecy
code is punishable with a prison term from one to four years under the reclusion
system (solitary confinement).' 5 Besides imposing terms of imprisonment,
punishment under Law No. 4.595 may include: advertence, a variable monetary
fine, suspension of the right to exercise financial functions, temporary or permanent
disqualification to manage financial institutions, or cancellation of authorization to
operate public financial institutions. 6
Half a year after the appearance of Law No. 4.595 - a seminal piece of
legislation for the Brazilian banking system affecting a broad range of financial
institutions - Congress issued Law No. 4.728, which provided detailed regulation
of access and distribution of securities in the capital market.'7 Because the
Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission" was not created until 1976, the
Brazilian Central Bank (Banco Central do Brasil) had the authority to regulate and
supervise all Brazilian financial institutions, including all exchanges of the
securities market. Law No. 4.728 was a very important law for the Brazilian capital
and financial markets and its national financial system. Article 4, section 2, of this
Law mandates that if the Central Bank verifies or is notified of any crime
committed by anyone within the national financial system, defined by law as being
the object of a Public Action Crime (crime de a¢do pilblica) it must immediately
notify the State Attorney or Public Prosecution Office. 9
Law No. 4.728 was mainly superseded by Law No. 6.385, which created the
Comiss~o de Valores Mobilihrios (CVM) - the Brazilian Securities and Exchange
Commission - and established new regulations for most aspects of the distribution
system of securities initially instituted by Law No. 4.728.20
In 1974, Congress decreed Law No. 6.024, which consolidated all prior
legislation concerning the bankruptcy of financial institutions.2' This law regulated
13 Id.
14 Id.
'5 Lei Complementar No. 105, art. 10, de 10 de janeiro de 2001, D.G.U. de 11.1.2001.
16 Lei No. 4.595, art. 44, de 31 de dezembro de 1964, D.O.U. de 31.1.1965.
'" Lei No. 4.728, de 14 dejunho de 1965, D.O.U. de 16.7.1965.
'8 Comissio de Valores Mobilidrios (CVM).
'9 Lei No. 4.728, art. 4, § 2, de 14 de junho de 1965, D.O.U. de 16.7.1965.
20 Lei No. 6.385, de 7 de dezembro de 1976.
21 Lei No. 6.024, de 13 de margo de 1974.
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the out-of-court liquidation and all aspects of forcible intervention in and out of
financial institutions, public and private, with only an exception for federal public
financial institutions.22 Bankruptcy proceedings took a backseat and were
considered a solution of very last resort.
Although Law No. 6.024 does not specifically deal with white-collar crimes -
at least not directly - it is important for the analysis of the subject matter because
both proceedings are regulated in detail by the law - i.e., the proceeding of
administration of the financial institution through a nominated interventionist and
the proceeding of forced, out-of-court liquidation take into account the possibility
that white-collar crimes have been committed. 23  According to the law, the
interventionist must indicate, with convincing evidence as support, harmful acts and
omissions committed by the administrators of the financial institution.24
Convincing evidence also is required for the proceedings of out-of-court liquidation
of the company." According to article 20, the report has to be made by the
liquidator of the company.26
An extremely important effect of both proceedings, specified in article 36, is the
total blocking - or freezing - of all property (chattels, securities, real estate, etc.)
belonging to the administrators or managers of the financial institution under
intervention or administrative liquidation.27 The property of managers is blocked
if they worked for the institution in the twelve months preceding the official act of
intervention or liquidation.28 The Central Bank or the CVM may extend these
precautionary measures beyond the managers to all members of the supervisory
council of the company, the lower echelon managers, and to any person who in the
twelve months prior to intervention or liquidation had bought, or otherwise
acquired, property from the aforementioned persons.29 Another important effect of
the official proceedings under scrutiny is the prohibition of persons affected by the
proceedings as managers, or otherwise, to leave the city or county where the
proceedings take place.30 These persons may only travel with the express
authorization given by the Central Bank or by the CVM.3 1 All public registration
offices for real estate transactions, airplanes, ships, automobiles, and so forth are
notified by the authorities not to register any sales transaction or donation while the
22 id.
23 Id.
24 Id. art. 11 (b).
25 Lei No. 6.024, de 13 de margo de 1974.
26 Id. art. 20.
27 Id. art. 3(c).
28 Id.
29 id.
30 Id.
3' Lei No. 6.024, de 13 de margo de 1974.
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proceedings occur.32
Articles 39 and 40 expressly consider and take into account the civil
responsibility of all persons involved in the proceedings, mainly managers and other
persons suspected of committing unlawful acts or omissions.3 These individuals
are jointly and severally responsible for such acts.
Article 41 regulates the official legal inquest proceedings which have to be
undertaken to specify and detect the reasons that caused the intervention or
liquidation, as well as the respective individual or collective responsibilities of all
persons involved.34 This inquest must be held by the Brazilian Central Bank." If
the result of the inquest points to criminal behavior (e.g., commission of white-
collar crime), the entire process and documentation must be delivered to the judge
who would be competent, or who would have jurisdiction, to open bankruptcy
proceedings, with immediate notification of the District Attorney or Public
Prosecutor.36 Any property of the indicted individual not yet blocked must be
sequestered at the request of the public prosecutor to the presiding judge.37
Law No. 6.024 is undoubtedly a milestone in respect to the treatment that the
Brazilian Federal Government dispenses to private and public non-federal financial
institutions that are in financial or administrative difficulties due to incompetent or
fraudulent administrative actions. While the law obviously punishes such behavior,
it is also quite clear that, in the interest of the whole financial system and the market
in general, the law vehemently attempts to avoid bankruptcy proceedings. The
Brazilian Central Bank and the CVM punish white-collar crimes but try to save
financial institutions from bankruptcy by first using the tool of the intervention, and
if this proceeding is not sufficient, they employ the second proceeding, called out-
of-court administrative liquidation." Bankruptcy is always possible, but it is
considered a proceeding of last resort.
In 1987, Decree-Law No. 2.321 was enacted to complement Law No. 6.024 and
created an entirely new proceeding to defend public finances.39 This new
proceeding received the official title: Regime of Special Temporary Administration
of Public Non-Federal and Private Financial Institutions.
The proceeding is applicable when the following facts or situations occur:
(a) repeated practice of transactions which are contrary to the
general guidelines of economic policy or financial policies of the federal
32 Id. art. 38.
3 Id. art. 39-40.
I d. art. 41.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Out-of-court administrative liquidations attempt to avoid the protracted and
complicated bankruptcy proceedings that typically occur in judicial liquidations.
" Decreto Lei No. 2.321, de 25 de fevereiro de 1987, D.O.U. de 26.2.1987.
2002]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
government as contained in federal law;
(b) the existence of non guaranteed debts;
(c) non-compliance with federal normative instructions in regard to
bank reserves to be maintained with the Brazilian Central Bank;
(d)fraudulent or reckless operations or transactions undertaken by
managers;
(e) losses caused by incompetent management, which put to risk the
credit ofcreditors; repeated non-observance or disobedience with respect
to federal bank legislation, which is not corrected after orders given by
the Central Bank, in accordance to its legal supervisory powers.
All cases or occurrences of fraud or unjustified non payment of
debts enumerated in articles I and 2 of the Bankruptcy Law, Decree-Law
No. 7.661 of June 21, 1945.4°
The proceeding does not interrupt the regular business routine of the affected
company or it's normal functioning. However, all managers and members of the
supervisory council immediately lose their powers of administration and
supervision of the financial institution affected by the proceedings." The new
management and supervision of the company will be exercised by specialists
nominated by the Central Bank and granted the full powers of management.
One of the important aspects of this powerful legal tool given to the Central
Bank is the introduction of the concept of strict liability to all former managers and
supervisors of the affected financial institution, independent of evidence of guilt,
blame, or criminal intentions (DOLUS).42 This radical innovation is contained in
article 15. The determining factor to impose this responsibility is the existence or
proof of control or connection of control (vinculo de controle). 3
Law No. 9.447 details the joint and several responsibility of all managers and
supervisors of all financial institutions subject to Law No. 6.024 and Decree-Law
No. 2.321.4' All irregular acts, whether crimes or not, committed by natural persons
or moral entities that are independent auditors, must also be submitted to the inquest
proceedings regulated by article 41 of Law No. 6.024.45 It can be said therefore that
Law No. 9.447 expands the reach of Law No. 6.024.
Article 7 guarantees the continuance of all civil and criminal actions against
indicted persons, even if the proceedings of intervention, out-of-court liquidation,
40 Id. art. I (translated by the author) (emphasis added).
41 id..
42 Id. art. 15.
43 Id. art. 15, § 1.
" Lei No. 9.447, de 14 de margo de 1997.
41 Lei No. 6.024, art. 41, de 13 de margo de 1974.
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or special temporary administration are interrupted or closed."6
Law No. 7.492 brought to the legal scene a new and fresh start to combat white-
collar crime. 7 Law No. 7.492 defines the meaning of financial institution. A
financial institution, or its equivalent, is defined as any moral entity, or even natural
person, of public or private law, which, as its or his main or even only secondary
activity, cumulatively or not, solicits, intermediates, or employs, applies and invests
financial resources which belong to third parties, operates with national or foreign
currency, issues, distributes, negotiates, administers or holds in custody any kind
of security or negotiable instrument.4 Additionally, the statute deals with
insurance, exchange, capitalization of moneys or resources, and any kind of savings
or third-party moneys."
Crimes against the national financial system are contained in articles 2 through
23 of Law No. 7.492. All are crimes of a white-collar nature. This is the list of
crimes and respective punishment:
(1) to print, duplicate, or fabricate in any way or to cause circulation without
written authorization of the issuing company, any certificate, or provisional
certificate or negotiable instrument, punishable by reclusion of two to eight years,
plus a fine;50
(2) to print, produce, divulge, distribute, or order, to distribute, prospects or any
kind of publicity of unauthorized securities or negotiable instruments, punishable
by reclusion of two to eight years, plus a fine;5
(3) to divulge false information or intentionally incomplete information in order
to cause a loss in respect to any financial information, punishable by reclusion of
two to six years, plus a fine;5.
(4) to manage any financial institution fraudulently, punishable by reclusion of
three to twelve years, plus a fine;"
(5) to manage recklessly, punishable by reclusion of two to eight years, plus a
fine;54
(6) to abscond or to take for one's self money, securities, real estate, or any
other chattel of which the person has possession, without due authorization of the
owner, punishable by reclusion of two to six years, plus a fine;5"
46 Id. art. 7.
47 LeiNo. 7.492, de 16 de junho de 1986.
48 Id. art. 1.
49 Id.
50 Id. art. 2.
51 Id.
52 Id. art. 3.
51 Id. art. 4.
54 Id.
55 Id. art. 5. Article 25 mentions those persons who exercise control of the company-
managers of financial institutions, directors, lower echelon managers - as well as any kind
2002]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
(7) to deal or negotiate with rights, securities, or any chattel or real estate
without authorization of the person who is entitled to give it, punishable by
reclusion of two to six years, plus a fine;56
(8) to induce or to maintain in error by withholding or giving false information
to a partner, investor, or competent public authority in connection with any financial
deal or situation, punishable by reclusion of two to six years, plus a fine;57
(9) to issue, offer, or negotiate in any securities which are:
I- false or falsified;
II - have been issued without previous registration with the competent
authority, or in divergent conditions of previous registration, or based
on an irregular registration;
III - issued without coverage or sufficient guaranties according to the law;
IV - issued without previous authorization of the competent authority,
whenever this is required by law.
Punishable by reclusion of two to eight years, plus a fine;"8
(10) to demand payment, without legal support, for interest, commission, or any
other type of compensation in connection with transactions which involve
insurance, credit, administration of mutual funds, or associations of mutually
helping investors, in order to acquire goods and valuables, dealing with securities
and stocks, punishable by reclusion of one to four years, plus a fine; 9
(11) to defraud a supervisor or any investor by inserting or making somebody
insert, into a certificate of investment, security, stock, bond, etc., a false statement
or a statement which is different from the one that should be inserted, punishable
by reclusion of one to five years, plus a fine;6"
. (12) to insert/include or to omit information required by law to be shown in
accounting documents of financial institutions, insurance companies, or any
company of the distribution system of negotiable instruments and securities;6
(13) to keep or circulate credits or values in an accounting system parallel to the
official one required by law, punishable by reclusion of one to five years, plus a
fine;62
(14) failure of the ex-manager of the financial institution to exhibit within the
time limits and conditions established by law, to the interventionist, liquidator, or
manager of the bankrupt estate, all information, statements, and affidavits or
of administrator, such as interventionists, administrators of bankrupt companies, and
liquidators. Id. art. 25.
56 Id. art. 5.
17 Id. art. 6.
58 Id. art. 7.
11 Id. art. 8.
60 Id. art. 9.
61 Id. art. 10.
62 Id. art. 11.
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documents which must be presented, punishable by reclusion of one to four years,
plus a fine;6
3
(15) to cause the disappearance of any chattels, real estate, or valuables, which
are banned from legal sale, donation, or any other means of transaction ban issued
as an order in a proceeding of intervention, out-of-court liquidation, or bankruptcy
of a financial institution, punishable by reclusion of two to six years, plus a fine; 64
(16) the taking by an interventionist, liquidator, or administrator of bankrupt
estate such chattels, real estate or valuables, or cause them to be transferred to
themselves or third parties, punishable by reclusion of two to six years, plus a fine;65
(17) to present in- and out-of-court, liquidation proceeding, or bankruptcy
process a statement of credit pending, or a false claim, or to present false or
simulated papers or documents, punishable by reclusion of two to eight years, plus
a fine; 6
6
( 18) to knowingly and falsely recognize a credit as legitimate by an ex-manager
or administrator of a bankrupt estate or person, punishable by reclusion of two to
six years, plus a fine; 67
(19) to operate without due authorization, or with fraudulently obtained
authorization, a financial institution, and to circulate and distribute securities and
other valuables, or to operate a money exchange, punishable by reclusion of one to
four years, plus a fine;6
8
(20) to receive or give financing to any of the persons mentioned in article 25
of this law (controller, administrator, manager, sub-manager of a financial
institution) directly or indirectly, or to finance, give money as advancement to a
controller, administrator, any member of a council mentioned in the articles of
incorporation, to spouses, parents or grandparents, sons and daughters or
grandchildren, or any inlaws of same blood or only related by law up to the second
grade, or to a partnership or corporation controlled by the financial institution,
directly or indirectly, or by any of the named persons, punishable by reclusion of
two to six years, plus a fine; 69
(21) to give or receive - in one's own name, as controller, or as administrator
of the partnership or corporation - financing, credit, money payment, salaries, "pro
labore," or any kind of payment to persons under the conditions of this article; the
same applies if the transaction is done secretly or if the payment of profits, their
receipt, or their promotion are undertaken by the financial institution secretly,
63 Id. art. 12.
64 Id. art. 13.
65 Id.
6 Id. art. 14.
67 Id. art. 15.
6 Id. art. 16.
69 Id. art. 17.
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punishable by reclusion of two to six years, plus a fine;7"
(22) to violate the secrecy of knowledge acquired on account of the
administrative functions exercised through an operation or service provided by a
financial institution, or any operative which integrates the national system of
distribution of securities, punishable by reclusion of one to four years, plus a fine;
(23) to obtain, by fraudulent means, a financial contract or money payment from
a financial institution, punishable by reclusion of two to six years, plus a fine. The
penalty is augmented by one-third if the crime is committed to the detriment of a
public financial institution, or by a private institution which receives credentials
from a public financial institution to give credit and financial help;
(24) to employ money and resources/credits, received from a public official of
a financial institution, in deals and transactions not foreseen or authorized by law
or contract, or received from a private institution authorized by a public financial
institution to open and give lines of credit, punishable by reclusion of two to six
years, plus a fine;"
(25) to use a false identity or to give to another person a false identity to
transact a foreign exchange, punishable by detention of one to four years, plus a
fine;74
(26) anyone who, under these circumstances, withholds information that he
should give, or makes false statements, punishable by detention of one to four years,
plus a fine; 75
(27) to perform an unauthorized foreign exchange in order to promote the
export of hard currency, punishable by reclusion of two to six years, plus a fine;76
(28) to anyone whom in any way promotes, without legal authorization, the
export of foreign moneys, or maintains foreign bank deposits that have not been
declared to the appropriate federal authorities, punishable by reclusion of two to six
years, plus a fine;77
(29) any action of a public official that delays, omits, or acts against an express
disposition of the law that is necessary for the regular functioning of the financial
system, as well as for the maintenance and preservation of the interests and values
of the national economic and financial order, punishable by reclusion of one to four
years, plus a fine.
Article 26 provides that any criminal action to punish all crimes enumerated in
Law No. 7.492 shall be undertaken by the federal public attorneys, in a federal
70 Id.
" Id. art. 18.
72 Id. art. 19.
7 Id. art. 20.
" Id. art. 21.
" Id.
76 Id. art. 22.
" Id. art. 22.
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court.7" Both the Brazilian Central Bank and the CVM may take part, as assistants,
in the judicial proceedings. The principle of secrecy of financial transactions and
bank operations may not be invoked to stymie criminal proceedings.79 Preventive
prison may be considered and decreed if the magnitude of the losses of a financial
nature justify the measure.
In 1998, Law No. 9.613 was issued to control money laundering operations and
the hiding of financial resources obtained in illegal transactions.8" The law created
a system to control financial operations, and to supervise, control, and inspect the
moving of goods and capital.8 ' The purpose of this law is to combat: (1) organized
crime syndicates; (2) incriminating behaviors which have the purpose to obtain
illicit gains from illicit economic or financial operations; (3) the narcotics and
related drugs trade, (4) terrorismj and (5) contraband and the ilkgal trafficking of
arms, munitions or any material necessary for their production.82 The law also takes
into account and punishes: (1) hijacking and extortion; (2) crimes against the public
administration; and (3) the request and demand, for one's self or for third parties,
directly or indirectly, of any favor or benefit as condition or price to undertake or
not to undertake any administrative action.83 The law also considers any crime
perpetrated by criminal organizations as a crime against the national financial
system.84
Article 1 of the law proceeds to typify as crimes the following procedures: to
hide or to dissimulate the nature, origin, whereabouts, disposition, and movement
of property or goods, values, and rights, which are obtained directly or indirectly
through operations and transactions which derive and are connected to crimes
mentioned above.85 The law defines in detail each concept listed in article lo, such
as to hide, to dissimulate, nature, and origin.86 The stipulated penalty for these
crimes varies from three to ten years of reclusion plus a fine.87
Paragraph 1 of article 1 of the Law specifies under three headings the
conversion of illicit gains obtained through criminal conduct into licit investments.8
The law goes to great lengths to define, conceptually, the whole operation. It
analyzes terms such as: to acquire, to receive, to exchange, to give or to receive
guarantees, to negotiate, to hold or to safeguard, to move, to transfer, to receive as
78 Id. art. 23.
71 Id. art. 29.
80 Lei No. 9.613, de 3 de margo de 1998, D.O.U. de 4.3.1998.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. art. 1.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
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a deposit, to import, to export, goods and valuables stating values which do not
correlate with the real value of the operation. 9 The penalty is three to ten years of
reclusion, plus a monetary fine.90
Paragraph 2 of article 1 punishes with the same penalty those persons who
handle and invest, in any economic or financial transaction, moneys and valuables
which are known to them as the product of illicit operations and crimes.9" For the
purpose of the law, it is considered the same as receiving, hiding, and selling stolen
goods (receptag~o - fencing).92
Law No. 9.613 also takes into account, for the purpose of sentencing, the
participation in organized crime and criminal groups, associations, or offices.93
Obviously the person must be clearly aware of the criminal behavior of his
companions or associates.
Paragraph 5 of article 1 regulates cooperative conduct of someone who is a
member of a criminal organization.94 Denunciation (delaggo) and information about
other criminal associates to the investigative authorities has a potential bonus. One-
third to two-thirds of the penalty may be reduced and the person cooperating may
only face a sentence of controlled liberty rather than confinement in prison.95 Any
information (denunciation) must be given spontaneously and the information must
be useful and helpful, facilitating the elucidation of crimes and detection and
detention of criminal associates or collaborators.96
A recent law, which resembles American legislation that probably inspired the
Brazilian legislature, institutes and regulates a witness protection program.97
The Brazilian anti-trust legislation has been updated by Law No. 8.884.98 In
Brazil, all crimes committed in this area are called "Crimes Against the Economic
Order." Law No. 8.884 is a revised version of, and complement to, Law No. 1.521,
as mentioned at the beginning of this Article.
Article 20 provides a resum6 of the infractions, breaches, infringements and
law-breaking behaviors that are most commonly perpetrated in this economic area.99
These truly deviant behaviors have more of an economic nature than other white-
collar crimes. These acts usually are committed by high echelon executives of large
corporations that try to control all or a segment of the market. In the opinion of the
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
9' Lei No. 9.807, art. 12, de 13 de junho de 1999, D.O.U. de 14.7.1999.
98 Lei No. 8.884, de 11 dejunho de 1994, D.O.U. de 13.6.1994.
9 Id. art. 20.
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Brazilian legislators, the efforts and shenanigans employed to achieve market
domination may also be considered a special type of white-collar crime.
Law No. 8.884 tries to protect free enterprise by prohibiting any conduct or
proceeding that limits, infringes upon, falsifies or does harm to free enterprise and
free initiative. The law's purpose is to combat market domination of goods and
services. Furthermore, it establishes as its goal to fight the arbitrary increase of
profits, as well as the posture and abusive exercise of market-dominating behavior.
The law presumes that a market dominating situation exists whenever a corporation
or an association of corporations dominates twenty percent of the market of any
goods or services.'00
The law tries to be quite specific in characterizing all types of deals and
operations. The law defines infractions of the economic order as the ultimate
purpose to curtail free enterprise, free initiative, and the workings of the free market
and trade competition.
The following facts, deals, and transactions are considered infractions:
(1) to establish or practice, in agreement with a competitor, under any form,
prices and conditions of sale of merchandises or services;
(2) to obtain or influence the adoption of a uniform commercial conduct or to
make such an agreement with the competition;
(3) to deny the market of the services of finished or unfinished goods or to
deny, with other producers, the sources of raw materials or intermediary products;
(4) to limit or obstruct the access of new companies to the market;
(5) to create difficulties in regard to the functioning and/or development of a
competing company, supplier, buyer, or finance company of goods and services;
(6) to obstruct a competitor's access to sources of raw materials, important
goods, equipment or technologies, or to deny access to channels of distribution;
(7) to demand or to concede exclusivity and to divulge publicity in regard to the
mass media;
(8) to agree upon prices in anticipation of a public bidding;
(9) to use methods of a false nature to provoke price oscillation of goods
pertaining to a third party;
(10) to regulate the market for goods and services, establishing agreements to
limit or control research and development of a technological nature, regulating the
production of goods and services, to block or make it difficult to obtain or distribute
investments destined to produce goods or services;
(11) to impose on distributors, retailers, dealers, or representatives of goods and
services any selling prices, discounts, conditions of payment, minimum or
maximum quantities, profit margins, or any other condition of sale, with respect to
their dealings with their third-party clients;
(12) to discriminate against buyers or providers of goods or services, employing
100 Id.
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price differentials or operational sale or service conditions;
(13) to refuse to sell goods or to provide service based on normal payment
conditions or according to commercial custom and practice;
(14) to make difficult or break the continuity or development of commercial
(trade) relations of an indeterminate nature on account of the refusal of the other
party to submit to unjustified clauses of a commercial nature or conditions which
violate free competition;
(1 5) to destroy, waste, or hoard basic materials, intermediate products, finished
products, as well to destroy, waste, or block the functioning of equipment employed
to produce or transport such materials or merchandise;
(16) to monopolize or impede the utilization of industrial or intellectual
property rights, or rights to explore technologies;
(17) to abandon or to force the non-cultivation of plantations, without just
cause;
(18) to sell merchandise below production costs without justification;
(19) to import merchandise below production costs in the country of origin,
which is not a member of GATT, or a signatory to the anti-dumping and subsidies
code;
(20) to interrupt or reduce in large scale production without just cause;
(21) to totally or partially cease factory operations, without just cause;
(22) to withhold or prevent production of consumable goods, with the exception
of those goods with a value that guarantees the cost of production;
(23) to condition the sale of one product on the acquisition of another, or to
condition the delivery of services on the delivery of another service or on the
acquisition of goods;
(24) to impose excessive prices, or to increase unjustifiably the price of goods
and services.'0 '
Law No. 10.303 regulates crimes against the capital (stock) market, especially
manipulation of information and the unauthorized use of privileged information by
insiders. 02
Articles 27-C, 27-D, 27-E, and 27-F of Law No. 6.385 became the basis to fight
the misuse of insider information.'0 3 A penalty of one to eight years of reclusion in
prison and a fine of up to three times the value of the illicit gain obtained, is
reserved for those convicted." 4 The misuse of insider information includes those
people who have negotiated simulated operations or executed any other kind of
fraudulent maneuver, with the intent to artificially alter the normal functioning of
the securities markets, trading in exchanges, over the counter markets, commodities
Io0 Id. art. 21.
02 Lei No. 10.303, de 31 de outubro de 2001, D.O.U. de 1.11.2001.
103 Lei No. 6.385, de 7 de dezembro de 1976.
104 Id.
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markets, and futures markets. Furthermore, such individuals must have acted with
the intent to obtain unjustified profit or advantage, either for oneself (personally)
or for another party, causing loss to third parties.
Article 27-D addresses specifically crimes committed by insiders. "I Reclusion
of one to five years and a fine of three times the value of the illicit gain obtained is
mandated for those who use relevant insider information. This includes information
not yet divulged to the market which should be confidential and is capable to
propitiate for the insider or for a third-party unjustified advantage, and information
used in any negotitiation in one's own name or in the name of a third party, to buy
or sell any kind of security, bond, share, stock or similar valuable.
Article 27-E punishes the unauthorized exercise of any function, activity, job,
profession or position, dealing with securities in the capital markets. 6 Such
punishment is warranted even without any gratuitous gain on a personal basis or as
an institution that is a part of the distribution system, as an administrator of a
collective portfolio of securities or individual portfolio, as an independent
investment agent, as an independent auditor or analyst of securities, or as a fiduciary
agent. Reclusion varies from six months to two years, in addition to a fine.
Article 27-F specifies that all fines imposed for crimes committed under articles
27-C and 27-D must be imposed in connection with the damage caused or the illicit
gain obtained.'0°
Article 30 of Law No. 6.385 specifies that any court procedure or litigation that
deals with the subject matter of the competence of the Brazilian CVM, the agency
must always be notified to intervene, within fifteen days of notification, if CVM
determines that this is necessary or opportune.108
105 Id. art. 27-D.
'16 Id. art. 27-E.
1o7 Id. art. 27-F.
loS Id. art. 30.
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APPENDIX A
A STUDY OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMES COMMITTED
AGAINST THE BRAZILIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
This Appendix contains a summary of the book, Penal Control of Crimes
Against the National Financial System, 1°9 by Under Federal State Attorney Ela
Wiecko V. De Castilho. The 352-page book was published in 1998 by Belo
Horizonte: Del Rey.
The research contained in the book was sponsored by the Brazilian Association
of Judges. A questionnaire was sent to 13,100 judges. 3,927 judges answered
(approximately thirty percent). The profile of the answering judges was as follows:
* Fifty-two percent of respondents were less than forty years of age.
* Eighty-three percent of respondents answered that they take into account, when
sentencing, social aspects of the case.
* Seventeen percent of respondents are conservatives, or legalistic or
traditionalists
* Twenty-one percent of the responding judges are female.
* Seventy percent of respondents are Catholics and married.
• Fifty-five percent of respondents stated that their parents only had primary
schooling.
The study analyzed a nine-year period from 1986 to 1995, which included 606
official communications of suspected fraudulent transactions made by the Brazilian
Central Bank to the offices of the Federal Public Attorneys. In each case, the facts
submitted indicate that the suspected fraudulent transactions could be prosecuted,
since they had been typified in the course of an administrative proceeding as white-
collar crimes under Law No. 7.492.
From the beginning of the study, the author/researcher stated that the
performance of the Brazilian Central Bank must be considered as very weak.
Based on the above statistic (606 communications of possible fraud in nine
years) the President of the Brazilian Central Bank (BACEN) stated in 1996 to a
special commission of the Brazilian Senate that the BACEN never says that a crime
has been committed. It is not the function of BACEN to affirm officially whether
a crime has been committed. The Central Bank does not decide on the culpability
of bankers, nor does it place them in handcuffs. The Brazilian Central Bank has
other functions.
This speech revealed the BACEN's absence of control, lack of interest in the
matter, a substantial lack of administrative proceedings against suspected
'09 ELA WIECKO V. DE CASTILHO, 0 CONTROLE PENAL NOS CRIMES CONTRA 0 SISTEMA
FINANCEIRO NACIONAL [PENAL CONTROL OF CRIMES AGAINST THE NATIONAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM] (1988); see also Lei No. 7.492, de 16 junho 1986.
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defrauders, and furthermore a pronounced lack of interest in the criminal
prosecution of financial wrongdoers."' After much criticism and accusations of
omission directed against BACEN, Minister of Finance Dr. Pedro Malan ordered
Mr. Gustavo Loyola, then-President of BACEN, to issue new and complete
information and statistics about the fraudulent transactions.
BACEN compiled new information covering a five-year period from 1991 to
1995. In March 1996, BACEN informed the Senate Commission that a total of
1,226 official communications resulting in suspicions of fraudulent behavior had
been compiled and partially prepared for delivery to the Federal State Attorneys.
However, only 606 communications had been analyzed and readied for official
delivery. Of those cases, 215 emanated from the State of Sao Paulo, sixty-seven
cases from the State of Rio Grande do Sul, and eighty-eight from the State of Mato
Grosso do Sul, with the remaining communications originating from all over Brazil.
It is clear that BACEN started to act only after the manifestation of much
criticism to prevent the fraudulent transactions from the year 1991 onwards.
Another interesting aspect that the study revealed was the number of years it
took the Central Bank to communicate possible criminal facts to federal criminal
prosecuting authorities. On the average, more than two years (twenty-six months)
elapsed prior to revealing the suspicious actions. In almost ten percent of the cases,
it took more than four years, and in only seventeen percent of the cases did it take
less than one year for the BACEN to act.
The average time it took the BACEN to implement an administrative inquiry
varied between two and three months, and the average time it took to conclude those
inquiries was approximately two years. The average time between indictment and
sentencing also totaled approximately two years.
Eighty percent of the sentences applied the statute of limitations. Of the
remaining twenty percent of sentences, thirteen percent were absolved and only four
percent of the cases were condemned. Three percent were mixed sentences.
The conclusion one has to reach, upon seeing those statistics, is one of almost
total impunity. For example, the 1994 Brazilian prison census did not register a
single inmate condemned for crimes against the financial system."'
This allows the following conclusion:
The Central Bank controls the mechanism of selection and determination of
most of the cases that should be considered crimes against the economic order.
There is no doubt that the Central Bank lacks inspection and control, and has a
laxity of active supervision. This is the main reason why so few cases of fraudulent
transactions are communicated to the federal prosecuting agency." 2 A second
reason is the manifest lack of interest of BACEN to communicate suspicious facts
'10 DE CASTILHO, supra note 109, at 157.
11 Id. at 228.
112 Id. at 230-31.
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of fraudulent activity. A third reason, possibly, is the connection that exists
between the top administration officers of BACEN and the top management officers
of the financial community. Many times, a top director of BACEN leaves a
government post and shortly thereafter becomes a director, CEO, or another type
of administrative officer of a private bank or financial institution. The reverse
transition from financial institution to governmental post has happened many times
as well.
Over the second semester of 1986 and all of 1987, not a single communication
of possible fraudulent behaviour was issued by the BACEN. Between the years
1988 to 1990, the number of communications made by BACEN is negligible. Only
in 1991 and primarily in 1992 did BACEN start to report possible criminal facts.
There is no doubt that BACEN is slow to act, and when it does act, it does not
regularly furnish important data and information." 3
One more factor must be taken into account - the "negotiating factor". Many
times, BACEN negotiates with the party(ies) possibly involved in economic or
financial crimes. These negotiations legitimately try to settle or resolve debts
incurred by the financial institution where illicit acts have been verified, thereby
making it usually impossible - or at least difficult - to portray the guilty
party(ies) as criminals once some kind of settlement has been reached.'"
On the other hand, it must be pointed out that the Federal Police usually does
not act on its own accord with respect to financial crimes. When initiated, however,
it takes the Federal Police approximately two months to conclude a preliminary
inquiry, which may serve as a basis for action for the Federal State Attorneyship.
Although the Brazilian Central Bank uses a preventive method of inspection of
all financial institutions under its jurisdiction, this method has been revealed to be
quite deficient. Most BACEN inspectors merely "go by the book" when verifying
whether instructions and standards issued by BACEN have been observed by the
management of these financial institutions. Instead, the investigators should verify
value and substantiveness of assets as well as liquidity. This pronounced lack of
practical procedure has been the hallmark of two important bank failures in recent
times: the sinking of the Banco Econ6mico of the State of Bahia, later bought by the
Spanish bank Banco Bilbao Viscaya, and the near-bankruptcy of the Banco
Nacional. Another famous case of mismanagement is the Banco Bamerindus of the
State of ParanA, which was negotiated with HSBC Hong Kong Shanghai Bank
Corporation.
Thus, it can be stated as a fact that - in general - the preventative inspection
of financial institutions and transactions by BACEN is not efficient.
For the years 1991 and 1992, statistics show that out of a total of 53,372
financial operations or deals, only 7,056 were inspected, within the framework of
113 Id. at 238-40.
",4 Id. at 245.
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375 inspection processes. This means that only about thirteen percent of the total
number of transactions were somehow inspected. Of these 7,056 inspected
transactions, 2,268 - approximately one-third (thirty-two percent) - showed some
type of irregularity. If one applies this percentage on the total number of
transactions during those two years, it is permissible to conclude that possibly more
than seventeen thousand financial transactions showed some type of irregularity.
Quite impressive and worrisome." 5
Another serious and worrisome aspect is the lack of knowledge and
preparedness of the federal sheriffs and inspectors. They usually do not understand
what has been perpetrated. An example of that lack of competence is the federal
police inquiry installed to detect fraudulent accounting practices in the case of the
Banco Nacional.' 6 The facts that were to be inspected occurred in 1988. Six years
later, in 1994 the Central Bank issued a communication about the facts. After an
additional two years of federal police detective work, nothing irregular was
discovered or detected. Another financial scandal, however, which already had
been under scrutiny for ten years, revealed facts and evidence that could have been
sufficient to indict and condemn the perpetrators of the Banco Nacional accounting
scam ten years earlier. The overall conclusion that one draws from this situation is
the fact that, for financial white-collar crimes, there is very little punishment in
Brazil. One may even speak of impunity.
Out of an estimated total of one million crimes committed per year in Brazil,
the small percentage that deals with white-collar crimes (i.e., acts and behaviors that
could be prosecuted under and according to Law No. 7.492) are simply ignored." 7
The reason for such a state of affairs, as shown, are manifold, but mainly are
derived from a lack of will to indict and prosecute. There also exists a lack of will
to gather facts on all levels from public authorities and likewise an almost total lack
of statistics and formal registration of criminal conduct.
In general, little importance is attributed to combat white-collar crime in Brazil.
The practical immunity of prosecution of perpetrators of white-collar crimes in
Brazil is a real fact."' Not only does the federal executive, through its agencies,
show a lack of interest to prosecute such criminal behaviors, but also the legislative
branch has shown a noted resistance to further criminalize, on a primary base, all
types of white-collar criminal, fraudulent behaviors.
Another reason that must be pointed out is the relationship, many times quite
close, between the holders of economic power - wheelers and dealers - and those
who exercise executive or legislative power. In fact, sometimes those individuals
in the first category sustain those of the second category in executive or legislative
"l Id. at 236.
116 Id. at 259.
17 Id. at 285.
"I1 Id. at 286.
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power.
In conclusion, I would like to point out that the research conducted by Dr. Ela
Wiecko V. De Castilho, Under Federal State Attorney, in this area of financial
white-collar crime has been absolutely crucial and has been published in a research
book, which I accessed, entitled 0 Controle Penal nos Crimes contra o Sistema
Financeiro Nacional [Penal Control of Crimes Against the National Financial
System]. 9" Most of the statistics and general conclusions of this paper have been
extracted from her seminal research, published in 1997.
"19 Id.
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